{"id":1711,"date":"2022-11-23T10:21:54","date_gmt":"2022-11-23T09:21:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/enpc.ergeais.com\/?p=1711"},"modified":"2025-07-29T15:01:44","modified_gmt":"2025-07-29T13:01:44","slug":"renovation-of-housing-for-energy-efficiency-in-detail","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ingenius.ecoledesponts.fr\/en\/articles\/renovation-of-housing-for-energy-efficiency-in-detail\/","title":{"rendered":"Renovation of housing for energy efficiency \u2013 in detail"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\n
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\u00a9 Arnaud Bouissou \/ Terra
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The desire to retrofit homes for improved energy efficiency manifests itself in the definition of increasingly ambitious targets1<\/a><\/sup>, and the introduction of ever more numerous public policies to achieve them: the (French) energy transition tax credit (CITE, which became \u201cMaPrimeRenov\u2019<\/em>\u201d (English: \u201cMyRetrofitBonus\u201d) in 2020); energy savings certificates (CEE) in the wake of the 2005 Energy Orientation and Scheduling law; a zero-percent eco-loan (EPTZ) following the 2009 Grenelle de l\u2019Environnement<\/em> (Environment Summit); a carbon tax from 2014 onwards, to name only the flagship policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, actual renovations are well below the targets: fewer than 300,000 high-performance renovations are completed each year, against a target of 500,000. Furthermore, doubt remains as to the effectiveness and fairness of the policies rolled out: grants such as the CITE and CEE are criticized for the \u201cdead-weight effect\u201d they produce and the resulting poor quality of the work carried out; the number of eco-loans taken out is only a tenth of that initially envisaged; the carbon tax creates inequalities that became a catalyst of the gilets jaunes<\/em> (\u201cyellow vests\u201d) crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moving towards comprehensive renovation of buildings…<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In light of this observed powerlessness, and stimulated by the French Citizens\u2019 Convention for Climate, more radical solutions are being examined, particularly the comprehensive renovation obligation: from 2030, any residential property that is due to be sold or have its lease renewed, but has an energy performance rating (DPE, similar to the UK\u2019s EPC) of F or G, it is mandatory to have the property renovated to \u201cA\u201d-rated standard2<\/a><\/sup> (CCC, 2020). This kind of measure has significant implications regarding the funding required, which is in the region of \u20ac30,000 to \u20ac50,000 per residence, far higher than the current average expenditure of \u20ac9,100 (ADEME <\/a>(French Agency for Ecological Transition) 2021). How can this financial burden be shared fairly and effectively between the State as provider of public goods and services (health, action to combat climate change, etc.), the households enjoying improved amenities (comfort), and third-party funders counting on the \u201cgreen value\u201d of housing? This question, sitting at the interface between microeconomics and macroeconomics, seems to be central in today\u2019s context: the plan to reset and relaunch following the COVID-19 pandemic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From 2040, this constraint will be extended to properties rated D and E.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

…but at what cost?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The answer to this question calls for analysis, within an integrated framework, of the interactions between a multitude of private actors, guided by a variety of economic behaviors and each targeted by specific public interventions (see figure 1):<\/p>\n\n\n\n